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The purpose of the paper is to analyse some results of cost-benefit analysis in a sample of ISPA (Structural 
Instrument for pre-accession countries) projects. The focus is particularly on the variability of financial and 
economic rates of return and how to integrate this information in the EU co-financing mechanism. We 
investigate, through the analysis of variance of co-financing rate, to which extent variability of rates is due to 
structural characteristics (sectors, countries) or to the existence of a residual variance due both to specificity 
of the project and discretional element of the appraisal method, which may constitute an information noise. 
We find that the variance of co-financing rate across countries is poorly explained by different composition 
of sectors of investment. This suggests the need to reinforce a more consistent approach to evaluation and 
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With the new programming period 2000-2006 for EU Structural Funds, evaluation becomes an integral part 
of the planning activity. New methodological approaches and innovative ways of improving evaluation 
strategies for regional policy has been developed and need to be discussed and tested.  
The purpose of the paper is to analyse some results of financial and economic analysis in a sample of ISPA 
(Structural Instrument for pre-accession countries) projects. The focus is on the variability of financial and 
economic rates of return and how to integrate this information in the EU co-financing mechanism. The main 
aim is to investigate, through statistical distribution of co-financing rate, to which extent variability of rates 
is due to structural characteristics (sectors, countries) or to the existence of a residual variance due both to 
specificity of the project and discretional element of the appraisal method, which may constitute an 
information noise. The basic idea, derived from a previous paper presented in Edinburgh Evaluation 
Conference1, is to consider project rates of return as signals for decision making, determined by unknown 
variables, including true structural parameters and measurement errors. We apply this idea to ISPA projects 
and show how to use our approach for a better incentive structure of co-financing. 
The paper developes an approach based on an empirical analysis of a database of about 240 projects. This 
empirical approach is based on a statistical analysis of expected project returns, and observation of average 
values and variance of the distribution of co-financing rate.  
The main result of the paper shows that the variation among co-financing rate is probably excessive and not 
justified by variations of expected returns among sectors or EU countries or ISPA countries. Some 
recommendations about improvements in the co-financing decision will be given.  
The paper has the following structure. First we briefly cite the context of EU Regional Policy through the 
Structural Funds and the debate on its impact. Second, we mention some issues in cost benefit analysis in 
this framework. Third, we present the specific aims and regulations of ISPA projects, and the co-financing 
mechanism. Fourth, we present our database on ISPA projects approved in 2000-2002. Fifth, we test our data 
by simple statistical techinques in order to see the possible origins of observed variance in some ex ante 
evaluation results. The paper is concluded by suggestions for improvements of the Commission approach to 
project appraisal and co-financing. 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
The “Agenda 2000” of the European Union commits substantial financial resources to Regional Policy for 
the programming period 2000-2006. Structural convergence is an ambitious objective and it depends, at least 
                                                      
1 M. Florio, An International comparison of the financial and economic rate o return of development projects, Fourth Conference on 
evaluation of the Structural Funds, Edinburgh, 18-19 September 2000.    -  3  - 
partially, upon effectiveness and efficiency in the use of instruments available in the new programming 
period: Structural Funds, Cohesion Fund and, in the perspective of enlargement, ISPA, among others.   
The current debate concentrates on the long-term sustainability of the Structural Policy of the European 
Union and its effectiveness with regards also to the enlargement process. Different opinions on more or less 
radical reforms of European interventions have been expressed on these issues2. Academic literature not 
always agrees with the optimistic Commission expectations: for the Commission's approach see European 
Commission (2003). For a critical view see for example Boldrin and Canova (2003).  
Among the main points raised by this debate about EU regional policy, there is the need to improve 
evaluation and projects selection. The new Regulations have tried to strengthen this perspective. In this paper 
we focus on cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  
CBA is explicitly required by new Structural Funds Regulation (Reg. 1260/99), Cohesion Fund (Reg. 
1264/99) and ISPA (Reg. 1267/99), for projects with a budget, respectively, of more than 50 Meuro, 10 
Meuro and 5 Meuro. Regulations state that Member States have the responsibility for prior appraisal, while 
the Commission must verify that information provided in the appraisal are exhaustive so to allow project 
selection and determination of the co-financing rate. This responsibility requires the Commission to develop 
specific technical skills in cost-benefit analysis. Moreover it is necessary that project proposer know the 
criteria on the basis of which significant decisions will be taken by the Commission. Project proposers 
should know which are the strategic information, focus on them, and improve the project's chance of success.  
Recently the European Commission, DG Regional Policy, has started a review of some aspects of project 
appraisal in the context of EU Regional Policy. We have been involved in the process, and this paper reflects 
our own experience and personal thinking on it. A new guide for project appraisal has been prepared, see 
European Commission (2001)3.  
A specific task of the review was to identify a standard methodology to be applied to the appraisal processes 
among different Funds, Geographical units, other Commission services, sectors of intervention, member 
states and accession candidates. The main task was to provide a simple set of rules in order to ensure some 
homogeneity and consistency in project selection process (about methodological issues in the use of 
Structural Funds). In fact, from the analysis of a sample of projects proposed in this last programming period 
a strong heterogeneity in the appraisal methodology by the Member States agencies had been noticed (see 
the discussion in Florio, 1997 and Florio, 2002). 
This paper wishes to clarify some aspects of the debate on project appraisal in the context of EU Regional 
Policy, with special reference to co-financing decisions.  
 
                                                      
2 On the effects of EU Regional Policy on the its convergence outcome, see in particular Armstrong (1996), Begg (1999), Bradley 
(1995), Fayolle and Lecuyer (2000), Lolos (2001), Pereira (1997). On impacts of EU Regional policy and effects of Structural Funds 
reforms on accession countries see Fayolle (1998), Nicolaides (1999), Swinnen (2001), Welfens (1999).  
Empirical evidence, moreover, would suggest contrasting conclusions: together with clear cases of success, like Ireland (see, for 
example, Barry, 1999, Barry, Bradley, and Hannan, 2001 and Payne, Mokken and Stokman 1997), there are less positive 
experiences, like the Mezzogiorno in Italy. For other country or region case studies see e.g. Bristow, Blewitt, (2001) for Wales, 
Dauce (1998) for Bourgogne, Lolos and Zonzilos (1994) for Greece.  
3 Previous editions were Guide to cost-benefit analysis of major projects in the context of EC Regional Policy, 1994 and 1997.   -  4  - 
2. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (CBA) ISSUES 
Investment projects co-financed by the Structural Fund (SF), the Cohesion Fund (CF) and ISPA are among 
the implementation tools for EU regional policies. According to EU Regulations infrastructural and 
productive investments may be financed by one or more of the Community’s financial tools: mainly grants 
(SF, CF, but also repayable aid for the ISPA), loans and other financial tools (European Investment Bank, 
Investment Fund). According to the SF reg. 1260/1999, art. 26, CF Reg. 1265/1999, art. 1 and ISPA Reg. 
1267/1999, Annex II (C), the Commission is responsible for the prior appraisal of major projects on the basis 
of information given by the proposer. 
Community regulations indicate which information must be contained in the application form for the 
purposes of an effective evaluation on the part of the Commission. Article 26 of reg. 1260/99, for co-
financing of major projects, asks for: 
- a cost-benefit analysis, 
- a risk analysis, 
- an evaluation of the environmental impact (and the application of the Polluter Pays Principle), 
- the assessment of impact on equal opportunities and on employment. 
Regulation for the Cohesion fund and the ISPA, in addition to stating that the proposals for co-financing 
must contain a cost-benefit analysis, a risk analysis and a detailed indication of the alternatives rejected, also 
provide some indications of the criteria to be applied in order to ensure the quality of the evaluation: in the 
case of environmental projects a cost-benefit analysis supplemented by other evaluation methods, possibly of 
a quantitative nature such as a multicriteria analysis and the consideration of the Polluter Pays Principle (see 
art. 10 (5), Reg. 1164/94 and the Council’s amendments). Other information that should be provided in the 
request for financing from the CF are: an evaluation of the direct and indirect effects on employment; an 
indication of the contribution of the project to European policies related to the environment and to trans-
European transport networks; a “financial plan that includes, wherever possible, information about the 
economic viability of the project” (see art. 10 (4), reg. 1164/94). 
Given the heterogeneity of projects presented by member states to the EC for the co-financing both in terms 
of budget, sectors and countries, final results of cost-benefits analysis can strongly vary for different criteria 
and methods of analysis. This can affect consistency of co-financing decisions and projects comparability. 
CBA, in fact, on the basis of the calculation of some summary performance indicators, allows the 
comparison of interventions performances in different sectors, countries, and institutions. But, in order to 
achieve consistent and comparable results from this exercise, which could be very useful in order to stress 
strengths or weaknesses in the programming process, a common methodological basis is needed. CBA per se 
may be more or less ingenuous and in-depth, but without coherent rules it cannot deliver a smooth and fair 
decision process. We list below some of the issues that may contribute to lack of consistency in project 
appraisal.  
 
Tab 1. shows the results of a previous survey on projects of the 1994-1999, along a number of typical items 
of CBA. The analysis was done by a team of independent experts (lead by M. Florio) on a sample of projects 
(ERDF and Cohesion Fund) of the previous programming period (200 projects in 1989-93, other 200 in 
1994-1999) and it stressed some crucial issues. The table reveals that in the previous project vintages there   -  5  - 
was large room for improvement in the quality of CBA and that there were also substantial differences 
between the European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund project, reflecting different 
institutional features of these instruments. 
 
 
Tab. 1. Overall assessment of CBA quality. Percentage on the total number of evaluated projects. Scores.  




Analysis Scores  (*) 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 
Financial  planning  7.5  1.1 91.4 21.5  7.5 71.0 
Financial  rate  of  return  15.1  0.0 84.9 23.4 16.8 59.8 
Forecast of changes of relative prices  14.0  29.0  57.0  8.4  26.2  65.4 
Overall methodology for financial analysis  6.5  7.5 86.0 19.6 24.3 56.1 
Economic  rate  of  return  67.7 16.1 16.1 36.4  4.7 58.9 
Estimates  of  the  shadow  prices  16.1 58.1 25.8 17.8 18.7 63.5 
Evaluation  of  externalities    11.8 54.8 33.4  1.9 33.6 64.5 
Overall  methodology  for  CBA    20.4 53.8 25.8  4.7 35.5 59.8 
Sensitivity  analysis  15.1 40.9 44.0 14.0 18.7 67.3 
Risk  analysis  0.0 0.0  100.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 
 Total  sample  2nd generation  Total sample 1st generation 
Analysis Scores  (*) 
  1 2 3 1 2  3 
Financial  planning  15.0  4.5 80.5 45.5 19.5  35.0 
Financial rate of return  19.5  9.0  71.5  10.0  15.5  74.5 
Forecast of changes of relative prices  11.0  27.5  61.5  1.5  8.5  90.0 
Overall methodology for financial  analysis  13.5 16.5 70.0  5.5 13.0  81.5 
Economic rate of return  51.0  10.0  39.0  34.5  13.5  52.0 
Estimates of the shadow prices  17.0  37.0  46.0  17.0  29.0  54.0 
Evaluation of externalities   6.5  43.5  50.0  4.5  7.5  88.0 
Overall methodology for CBA   12.0  44.0  44.0  21.5  24.0  54.5 
Sensitivity  analysis  14.5 29.0 56.5  9.5 28.5  62.0 
Risk  analysis  0.0 0.0  100.0 6.0 2.0  92.0 
(*)  1=Existing and adequate;  
2=Existing but not completely adequate;  
3=Not existing or inadequate; 
Source: M. Florio, “An international Comparison of the Financial and Economic Rate of Return of Development Projects”, DEPA 
Working Paper, 99.06-dicembre.  
 
In other previous project surveys we have focussed on the comparison of the rates of return in the different 
sectors and institutions (EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; World Bank, and 
other EU projects), see Florio 1999. We find substantial room for improvement of consistency in these 
international organizations as well.  
Performance indicators collected for a large sample of project can be analysed with the aim to: 
- obtain a set of benchmarks for comparability across countries and sectors; 
- identify the main differences in methodology and approach in order to fix a set of CBA rules; 
- improve the quality of proposals among sectors and countries, and make the selection process and the 
determination of co-financing rate more transparent. 
These previous surveys and our own new findings, stress that the new 2000-2006 project vintage shows clear 
improvement in the quality of analysis as compared with the previous exercises. However, there still are 
some key issues in project analysis that need to be addressed. These include: 
a) time horizon;   -  6  - 
b) residual value at end year; 
c) determination of the total cost of investment (depreciation, “replacement cost” reserves, “contingency” 
reserves); 
d) financial discount rate; 
e) social discount rate; 
f) calculation of performance indicators; 
g) determination of the co-financing rate.  
We turn now to briefly discuss these key issues in cost-benefit analysis of infrastructure projects.  
 
a). Time horizon 
Time horizon is the maximum number of years for which forecasts are provided. The number of year usually 
reflects the lifetime of the investment and project cycle. After that period of time project activity is (usually 
only fictitiously) expected to stop and the investment sold out. However, time horizon of an investment 
could be virtually indefinite. It is just a matter of convenience to forecast a final year when assets and 
liabilities are simultaneously liquidated.  
In practice, there are often excessive variations in the determination of the time horizon across similar 
projects4. The choice of time horizon can seriously affect the results of the appraisal process (See Graph 1 
where we show an example, for a specific project, of different time horizons and calculation of the rate of 
return). 
 
Graph. 1. Different time horizon for the calculation of the financial rate of return (thousand of Euro)  
 
                                                      
4 Lifetime of investments is duly considered in the Funds Guidelines. For the CF the Guidelines say: “The lifetime varies according 
to the nature of the investments: it is longer for civil engineering works (30-40 years) than for technical installations (10-15 years). In 
the case of a mixed investment comprising civil engineering works and installations, the lifetime of the investment may be fixed on 
the basis of the lifetime of the principal infrastructure (in this case investment in the renewal of infrastructure with a shorter lifetime 
must be included in the analysis). The lifetime may also be determined by considerations of a legal or administrative nature: for 
example the duration of the concession where a concession has been granted”. 
For the ISPA Fund the Guidelines say: “infrastructure projects are generally appraised over a period of 20-30 years, which represents 
a rough estimate of their economic life span. Although the physical assets may last significantly longer than this – e.g. a bridge may 
last for 100 years - it is not generally worthwhile trying to forecast over longer periods. In the case of assets with a very long life, a 
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The problem could be solved as follows: 
- by asking the proposer to include always their best estimate of the residual value at final year (see below); 
- by suggesting a standard time horizon. 
Theoretically residual value should be expressed as the discounted sum of future forecasted flows over time 
horizon to infinity. This is often unpredictable. Usually for public work or industrial activity usually it is 
used the average physical lifetime value of stock of fixed capital (buildings, machinery, equipment).  
For the standard time horizon there are in turn two possibilities: 
- either to ask the significant tables to be computed for a fixed number of years; 
- or to allow for some flexibility according to the kind of project, in order to consider the different life of 
service of the main assets, so the standard grid for time horizon should be differentiated by sectors, and 
based on some accepted international practice: for example the one suggested in the new Guide. 
The new Guide proposes a sectoral grid. Project proposers are expected to follow the proposed time horizon, 
or to give evidence for a different choice. Nevertheless the Member States could indicate which are their 
standard practices and establish standard criteria for the projects of the same nature for national purposes. 
 
b) Residual value at end year 
Among revenue items at the last year considered by CBA there is the residual value of the project. Residual 
value should be understood as the market value for the fixed assets (or liquidation value of assets in the case 
they are sold out at end year) and includes the appraisal of the net revenues the project can generate beyond 
time horizon, before any substantial revamping or replacement of the old investment.  
Omitting this value, as sometimes happens, is a serious mistake that may artificially depress the project 
returns. Infact the present value of net revenues with this value would be higher than the rate without the 
value. Even if the project would not be really liquidated at end year, project analysis considers as the end of 
the project cycle coincides with the liquidation of residual investments.  
The residual value at end year must be included as follows: 
- the residual market value for fixed assets, as if they should be sold out at the end year of time horizon 
(including the stream of future net income generated by the project); 
- the residual value for any other current assets or liability. 
In other words, the residual value is the liquidation value of the project and not its perpetual value5. The 
discounted value of every net future revenue after the time horizon should be included in the residual value. 
 
c) Determination of the total cost of the project 
The cost of a project is given by the sum of investment and operating  costs. The total cost of the project is 
used by the Commission services to calculate the co-financing rate (see below) which is applied to eligible 
costs of investment. 
The difference between eligible costs (on the amount of which the co-financing rate is calculated) and the 
total costs are:  
                                                      
5 The CF Guidelines rightly say: “If it is considered that an investment has a residual value at the end of the selected period, this 
value must be taken into account, provided that it represents revenue for the owner (from the sale of the asset or its use during a 
period following the period used for the financial analysis)".    -  8  - 
- land purchase expenditure; 
- payment of VAT; 
- expenses borne before the application presentation; 
- related work or connected expenses. 
The international methodology for financial analysis of projects is made on a discounted cash flow basis 
(DCF). According to this approach all items that do not give rise to an effective monetary expenditure must 
be excluded, even if they are items normally included in company accounting (Balance Sheet and Profit and 
Loss Account). In particular the following item sometimes found in project proposed for EU co-financing are 
not consistent with the DCF methods: 
- depreciation; 
- reserves for future replacement costs; 
- contingency reserves. 
Depreciation cannot be included in cost items6, otherwise the investment costs of physical assets is double 
counted, once at the beginning of activity when investments are paid and a second time during the period of 
project life cycle. Investment costs are included as outflows only when they are really paid, that means when 
there is a monetary outflow. In this case co-financing rate would be artificially augmented. 
Occasionally some replacement costs appears in some projects. Replacement cost is the cost paid for the 
replacement of some physical assets after its life cycle. This cost usually is financed by writing in the 
accounts the constitution of a reserve year after year until the real cost is paid. If the reserve appears among 
outflows this is an unduly anticipation of future costs and in the logic of discounting this lowers enormously 
the projects returns. Only an actual forecasted flow for a future replacement, for example for short-life 
equipment, should be considered in the outflows.  
Contingencies reserves are constituted as a guarantee for eventual future risk. From a sample of project 
examined these costs vary from 0% to 20% of the total cost of investments, with an average value of 6%.  
For the same reasons of replacement costs, contingency reserves, as unexpected events, are best treated in 
risk analysis: as they are not cash outflows, they have not to be included as cost items7. 
 
d) Financial discount rate 
The discounting process allows to sum financial flows occurring at different years. It is used to give a 
present value to future ones and to calculate the net present value of the sum of the balance of cash flows. A 
problem we have observed is that quite often project proposals lack an appropriate distinction between 
financial and economic discount rate.  
The rate at which future financial values are discounted to the present is usually roughly equal to the 
opportunity cost of capital. It should reflect the preference for the present compared to future financial flows.  
In this view it could be consistent to have different financial discount rate in different countries, reflecting 
different opportunity cost of capital in different financial markets. Infact the sample of projects examined 
shows a range of discount rates, from a minimum value of 3% to a maximum of 11%, with an average value 
                                                      
6 About depreciation the CF Guidelines, annex D, point 2.1. says clearly: "depreciation need not to be taken into account". 
7 However this point is rather controversial, because in practice project proposers were allowed to include replacement costs and 
contingency reserves in their cost forecasts.   -  9  - 
of 5%. Nevertheless this could affect the calculation of the net present value (NPV, which is one of the most 
crucial performance indicator).  
In order to achieve consistency there are two pathways:  
- the standard practice worldwide is to take the return on Government bonds as a minimum benchmark. For 
investment in public sector it would be safe to use the real interest rate on public bonds of maturity 
equivalent to the project horizon. This solution will lead to different financial discount rate for each country, 
but based on the same calculation rule.  
- An alternative solution would be to consider the real interest rate of a prime lender, e.g. EIB ‘European 
Investment Bank' bond denominated in Euro, of equivalent maturity of the project horizon. In this case 
opportunity cost of capital is assumed to be the same in the public sector in the European Union.  
The final solution was based on a mix of the two mentioned approaches. The CF Guide says: "in practice and 
under the current conditions this rate ranges from 6% to 8% at real prices". 
In the new Guide a standard 6% has been suggested as standard financial discount rate.  
 
e) Social discount rate 
Social discount rate is used for discounting in the economic analysis. It reflects the view on how future social 
benefits and costs should be valued when compared with present ones. For this reason theoretically a social 
discount rate determined country by country should better reflect this view.  
As for the financial discount rate also for the social discount rate there are three alternatives:  
- to use the real financial rate of return, supposing that the marginal public investment should have the same 
return as the private one; 
- to use a formula based on the long term growth rate of the economy ; 
- to use a standard conventional cut-off rate (World Bank and EBRD use a quite high real 10% required rate 
of return). 
For social discount rate it is even more difficult to fix a standard benchmark across Europe, and this is not 
the place to discuss in detail this point. However a 5-6% rate, seems to be, under present circumstances, a 
reasonable compromise among the three approaches (taking 3-10% as extreme boundaries of a likely range). 
However, in specific cases, the project proposer may wish to justify a different value. 
 
f) Calculation of performance indicators 
The financial internal rate of return is the value that zeros out the financial net present value of the 
investment, and could be considered as the maximum value the interest rate could assume without making 
the investment a net loss compared to an alternative use of capital. Under a specific value of FRR taken as a 
benchmark, the investment should be considered not suitable. 
The financial internal rate of return is in practice the solution for FRR in the equation below:  
NPV (S) = Σ St / (1+FRR)
t = 0 
The FRR should be calculated both for the investment and for the own capital. 
The financial investment return (FRR/C) is the capacity of operating net revenues to sustain the investment 
costs regardless the way in which they are financed. It is calculated considering total costs of investments as 
outflow and revenues generated by the project as inflow. It evaluates the overall financial profitability of the   -  10  - 
project or, as more often it will be the case, the net cost for public finance when project revenues are zero or 
insufficient. 
The financial return on equity capital (FRR/K) gives the rate of return of the project considering its financial 
burden, regardless the investment cost. In this case the outflows are own capital of private investor (when it 
is paid up), national contributions (local, regional and central levels), financial loan at the time they are paid 
back, in addition to operating costs and related interest, and inflows are revenues generated by the project. 
 
Tab.2. Example of the table for the calculation of FRR/C 
 YEARS 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
      Sales            
   Residual value             
Total  revenues            
   Total operating costs                     
   Total investment costs                     
T o t a l   e x p e n d i t u r e s             
N e t   c a s h   f l o w             
Financial internal rate of return (FRR/C) of the investment   
Financial net present value (FNPV/C) of the investment   
 
Tab.3. Example of the table for the calculation of FRR/K 
 YEARS 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
      Sales            
   Residual value             
Total  revenues            
   Total operating costs                     
      Interests            
      Loans  reimbursement            
      Private  equity            
   Total national aid                     
T o t a l   e x p e n d i t u r e s             
N e t   c a s h   f l o w             
Financial internal rate of return (FRR/K) of own capital   
Financial net present value (FNPV/K) of own capital   
 
The internal rate of return calculated in the economic analysis (the value that zeroes out the economic net 
present value of the investment, is the economic internal rate of return (ERR). 
The difference between ERR and FRR (both of investment and own capital) is that the former uses 
accounting prices or the opportunity cost of goods and services instead of distorted market prices, and it 
includes as far as possible any social and environmental externalities. This distinction would be kept in mind 
in the following discussion.  
3. THE ISPA PROJECTS CASE STUDY 
Average GDP per capita in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still much below than that of the Member 
States. More than 93% of population in CEE countries is living in regions with a per capita GDP below the 
75% of the enlarged Union average.  
Pre-accession strategy implemented by Structural Policies in 2000-2006 aims at:  
−  establishing a comprehensive accompanying strategy;   -  11  - 
−  creating a unique mechanism of intervention that includes all the different forms of EU aid 
(Accession Partnership); 
−  Familiarising accession countries with the policies and procedures of the Union to take actively part 
to the programmes and interact with EU legislation. 
Pre-accession instruments include:  
−  Phare (whose objective is the consolidation of institutions in the accession countries, participation to 
EU programs, social and regional development, industrial reorganisation and SMEs development); 
−  Sapard (agricultural modernisation and rural development promotion); 
−  Ispa (supporting transport and environmental protection measures).  
Financial endowment for years 2000-2006 is Euro 21,84 billions, distributed as shown in Tab. 4.  
 
Tab.4 Breakdown of financial resources by year and instrument - Euro millions, 1999 prices.  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  Total 
Phare 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 10920 
Sapard  520 520 520 520 520 520 520 3640 
Ispa  1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040  7280 
Total  3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 21840 
Source: European Commission, 2000. 
 
Ispa Fund is the most important for infrastructural investments. Ispa financial resources are divided 
according to a minimum and maximum amount for each country, which can be adjusted according to 
progresses in the measures’ implementation.  
 
Tab.5 Breakdown of Ispa budget by countries.  
Country Range 
Bulgaria   8.0% - 12.0% 
Czech Republic   5.5% - 8.0% 
Estonia   2.0% - 3.5% 
Hungary   7.0% - 10.0% 
Latvia   3.5% - 5.5% 
Lithuania   4.0% - 6.0% 
Poland   30.0% - 37.0% 
Romania   20.0% - 26.0% 
Slovakia   3.5% - 5.5% 
Slovenia   1.0% - 2.0% 
Source: European Commission, Official Journal L72, 21 March 2000, p. 21 
 
For the period 2000-2002 more than 249 projects8 have been funded for a total co-funding of Euro 5648 
millions and a total eligible cost of investments of more than Euro 8700 millions. These amount represents 
more than 73% of the total ISPA budget announced for years 2000-2006.  
 
                                                      
8 See the website: http://www.inforegio.cec.eu.int/wbpro/ispa/projec_en.htm   -  12  - 
Tab. 6 Funding decided in 2000 and 2001 by country 




Projects financed in 2001 
Bulgaria.   9   349.6   Construction of regional wastewater treatment plants and the electrification of railway networks. 
Czech 
Republic 
14  171.4   Construction of roads, regional drinking and wastewater treatment plants and the decentralisation of the 
management system. 
Estonia  14  82.4   Construction of roads, sewerage system upgrading, regional waste treatment plants and technical assistance 
Hungary  23  337.1   Regional waste management, the rehabilitation of railway lines, a regional sewerage and sewage treatment 
programme, the preparation for implementing EU urban wastewater directives and technical assistance. 
Latvia.   17  219.7   Waste management, road construction, modernisation of railway systems and technical assistance 
Lithuania   16  143.6   Modernisation of telecommunications, the development of regional waste management systems and technical 
assistance. 
Poland   35  1,402   Construction of sewage treatment plants, preparation and upgrading of railways, motorway construction, 
urban and municipal water and wastewater projects and technical assistance. 




10  172.5   Upgrading and extension of regional wastewater treatment, motorway construction, modernisation of railway 
networks, and technical assistance. 
Slovenia  9  45   Construction of regional water supply and wastewater treatment plants and the modernisation of a railway line 
Fonte: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guestfr.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/02/253|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display.  
 
The main beneficiaries of the total estimated EU contribution for projects signed in 2000-02 are Poand 
(37%) and Romania (21%). All the other countries have a share of contribution between 10% (Hungary) and 
1% (Slovenia).  
 
The Ispa approach is quite similar to that of the Cohesion Fund and co-finances projects or groups of 
projects. Its priorities are:  
•  Familiarising them with the policies and procedures of the European Union  
•  Helping them catch up with EU environmental standards  
•  Expanding and linking with the trans-European transport networks  
 
Ispa regulation states that projects applications must contain, besides basic information about the project 
(name of the responsible body, nature of the measure, a brief description, cost and localisation, 
implementation timesheet): 
−  A cost benefit analysis which includes direct and indirect employment effects, quantified, if possible, 
and the explicit indication of internal rate of return, net present value and cost/benefit ratio;  
−  Indication of environmental impact;  
−  Information on consistency with antitrust legislation;  
−  A financial sheet with clear indication of requested co-funding and other possible public funds (Ebrd, 
World Bank); 
−  Other information on consistency with EU and national legislation. 
Methodologies and procedures to be followed for ex-post evaluation and monitoring are described in Annex 
IV of Ispa Regulation (EC Reg.1267/1999).  
 
Selection and financial procedures is similar for all the projects. State proposer must provide all the 
significant information in order to enable the Commission to make the ex ante appraisal. The State proposes 
the project through the National Ispa Co-ordinator. Applications are examined by Ispa directorate of DG 
Regio. EU Commission could ask for additional information on specific issues, if provided information are   -  13  - 
not sufficient to express an opinion. The final decision is the result of a strict dialogue with the proposer. 
When the project is acceptable it is submitted to the Management Committee, made up of representants of all 
Member States. After the favourable advice of the Management Committee the EU Commission adopts the 
project undersigning, together with the Candidate Country, the Financing Memorandum.  
 
The co-financing rate is the percentage of investment costs to be covered by EU grant. When a project is 
proposed to the European Commission for co-financing the final decision by the Commission is about the 
co-financing rate to be applied. The way the investment project co-financing rate is determined by the EC is 
the subject of some debate. The new Regulations, while fixing a maximum co-financing rate, (see tab. 7) 
explicitly ask the Commission to determine the actual rate taking into account: 
- the existence of project revenues; 
- the polluter-pays-principle. 
 
Tab. 7 Ceilings for the co-financing rate as from the Regulation9 
Structural Funds 
Types of region/country  Max co-financing rate 
  % of total eligible costs 
Ob. 1  75 
Ob. 1 + Cohesion Fund  80 
Ob. 1 + Cohesion Fund /region ultra peripheral  85 
Ob. 2 e 3  50 
Cohesion Fund 
Cohesion Fund Country  80-85 
Ispa 
Ispa Country  75-85 in exceptional cases 
Fonte: Structural Fund Reg. 1260/1999, Cohesion Fund Reg. 1265/1999, Ispa Reg. 1267/1999. 
 
There is no obligation for the Commission to disburse the maximum rate of co-financing; nevertheless it is 
necessary to determine a clear methodology to calculate the rate to be applied. CF Guidelines say:  
“The rate of assistance from the Cohesion Fund to the project will not exceed the ratio between the 
equity gap and the investment or the rate laid down in the Regulation, whichever is the lowest. The 
rate will be fixed in the light of the characteristics of the project and with particular attention to the 
results of the economic analysis, the need to maximise the multiplier effect and the application of the 
polluter-pays principle. The rate will be fixed so as to maximise the multiplier effect of the resources 
of the Fund; that means that the contribution of the Cohesion Fund has to be the minimum needed to 
make the investment materialise”.  
 
-  ISPA Guidelines say:  
“Except in the case of repayable assistance or when there is a substantial Community interest in the 
project, the rate of assistance shall be modified from the maximum rate mentioned above, taking into 
account: i) the availability of co-financing; ii) the capacity of the project to generate revenues; and - 
the application of the polluter-pays principle”. 
 
In practice a rather simple procedure has been established. The procedure is based on the 'equity gap' or 
'financing gap' approach. As stated in the CF Guide:  
'A comparison between the current value of the net revenue and the current value of the investment 
determines the percentage of the investment that can be supported by revenue. Budgetary resources 
                                                      
9 The maximum ceiling for co-financign rate stated by Ispa regulation (75% of total eligible cost) could be risen to 100% for 
technical assistance and to 85% for other sectors in exceptional case.   -  14  - 
(equity gap) must cover the remainder of the investment. The ratio between the equity gap and net 
investment constitutes the ceiling on the assistance that may be granted to the project. The rate of 
assistance from the Cohesion Fund to the project will not exceed the ratio between the equity gap and 
the investment or the rate laid down in the Regulation, whichever is the lowest.' 
 
The basic idea is to fill in the “financing gap” by EU grants. That means that, if C is the net present value of 
total cost of the investment, R the net present value of the revenues generated by the project, E the eligible 
cost, (C-R) is the financing gap, we have that r is the co-financing rate and G is the EU grant defined as 
follows: r= (C-R)/C and G= E*r.  
 
Tab.8 The discount rate and the co-financing gap: an example* 
Basic project data 
Total eligible cost    36.000.000 
Proposed ISPA grant    27.000.000 
Co-financing required    9.000.000 
Grant rate  75% 
The choice of a discount rate 
Scenario (DR)  6%  8% 
Co-financing gap  47%  51% 
* This example is based on an ISPA environmental project 
 
In fact some obvious problem may occur with this procedure: 
-  if the accounting rules are not harmonised the results may vary widely; 
-  the procedure does not say anything about how to modulate the rate according to the project merit 
(for example according to the developmental and environmental merit of the project); 
-  the formula may give an incentive to exaggerate expected costs, and to bring down revenues; 
moreover it risks to give a larger grant to (financially) worse projects; and this is very questionable, 
as the social costs and benefit of the project does not enter in the allocation mechanism. 
In principle it should be advisable to modify the procedure in two directions: 
-  use standard accounting rules, as those proposed to calculate total cost of investment; 
-  modulate the co-financing rate according to performance indicators. 
The basic idea is that, after removing every inconsistencies due to different methodological approaches, 
which could bias the process, in our opinion in future it would be advisable to modulate the rate of the 
financial support according to the real economic and financial performance of the project, as they are 
measured by the appropriate indicators. This will make the co-financing rate endogenous and would create a 
system of incentives for projects that are particularly good in terms of their expected economic and 
development impact.  
Some remarks should be made on the calculation and the real meaning of these indicators. 
 
4. DATA AND TESTING 
Our project database comprises 240 projects in eleven countries, based on data released in 
www.inforegio.com. Table 9 shows a breakdown by type of infrastructure and by country. Environment 
related projects are more than two thirds of the sample, the remaining being transport projects.    -  15  - 
Tab. 9. Sample size - Breakdown by countries and sectors  






Airport Highway Railway  Road  Total 
Bulgaria   11  2  1  1  1  1  1  18 
Czech  Republic  15 5  2     6 3  3  34 
Estonia 2  4  4  2        3  15 
Hungary   5  1  11   2 5  2  26 
Lithuania   7  1  6      1  7  22 
Latvia   2  6  1      4  4  17 
Poland 5  20  7  3  1  5  5  6  52 
Romania  6 8  8  2   1 1  4  30 
Slovenia 2  4    1      3    10 
Slovakia  2 9  1     1 3    16 
Total  32 75  32  27  2 16 26  30  240 
 
The countries with a higher number of projects in the sample are Poland (52), Czech Republic (34), Romania 
(30), Hungary (26). Tab 10 and 11 shows the average amount of ISPA grants, again by sectors and countries.  
 
Tab. 10. ISPA grant (Euro millions) – Breakdown by countries 
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Bulgaria 153.00  7.65  29.25  38.30  15 
Czech Republic  72.78  9.15  22.81  17.31  12 
Estonia 14.16  3.20  6.77  3.41  12 
Hungary 133.23  4.88  29.88  31.08  23 
Lithuania 45.56  2.75  11.26  9.72  21 
Latvia 67.46  3.03  16.03  17.38  17 
Poland 189.53  6.23  41.45  37.51  42 
Romania 231.73  7.26  46.73  50.02  24 
Slovenia 10.21  2.56  6.86  2.79  10 
Slovakia 58.43  3.97  18.36  16.77  16 
Total 231.73  2.56  27.15  32.93  192 
 
The information available to us does not cover all the projects, and the sample is here of 192 projects (tables 
for other information are often based on smaller samples because of missing data). The average ISPA grant 
in our sample is of around 27 million Euro, but there is a very large standard deviation. The minimum is just 
2,6 million, the maximum (a waste management project in Romania) around 231,7 million Euro. In our 
sample ISPA projects for Slovenia and Estonia are particularly small on average grant, while the average 
project in Poland and Romania get more EU funds. This high variability is confirmed by the breakdown by 
sector. For instance, the average sewage project obtains a 67 million Euro grant, while the average railroad 
project obtains 12,4 million. 
 
Tab. 11. ISPA grant (Euro millions) – Breakdown by sectors 
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Water and environment  40.52  2.56  17.00  13.64  13 
Sewage 84.21  50.00  67.11  24.19  2 
Environmental protection  189.53  17.12  68.41  64.02  9 
Waste management  231.73  7.66  59.51  51.75  26 
Airport 72.42  2.75  17.34  15.92  70 
Highway 46.82  5.00  17.58  12.91  23 
Railroad 45.43  3.03  12.43  10.30  26 
Road 138.01  4.34  34.54  32.05  23 
Total 231.73  2.56  27.15  32.93  192 
 
As we have mentioned in a previous section, project proposer should give the Commission some forecast  
about the project performance. We show the following indicators:   -  16  - 
a)  FRR without ISPA, Tab. 12 and 13, respectively by countries and sectors, this is the financial rate of 
return before the EU grant, and reflects the project performance at market prices (often controlled 
tariffs). For our sample the average is a negative FRR, around – 2,5%. This is not surprising, because 
these infrastructures typically have low commercial returns and for this reason they ask a capital subsidy 
to the European Commission. It is interesting that the average FRR for this sample of ISPA project is 
quite low when compared with previous evidence on ERDF and Cohesion Fund. The sector breakdown 
shows a sizeable variability, with water and waste management projects forecasting substantial losses, 
while project in other sectors show modest but positive returns.  
 
Tab. 12. FRR without ISPA – Breakdown by countries 
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Bulgaria  5.00 5.00 5.00  -  1 
Czech Republic  0.00  -28.30  -10.54  9.65  16 
Estonia  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Hungary 5.51  -11.46  -3.98  4.64  9 
Lithuania  0.00 0.00 0.00  -  1 
Latvia 1.50  -3.80  -1.59  2.65  5 
Poland  9.53  -6.40 2.81 3.51  17 
Romania  9.00  -7.70 1.64 7.00  4 
Slovenia  4.40  -3.08 1.34 2.76  5 
Slovakia  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Total 9.53  -28.30  -2.52  8.07  58 
 
Tab. 13. FRR without ISPA – Breakdown by sectors  
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Water and environment  4.00  -28.30  -9.64  10.47  16 
Sewage 9.00  -8.70  -0.11  4.87  19 
Environmental protection  9.53  -3.80  2.04  5.03  6 
Waste management  5.51  -11.46  -3.29  5.19  8 
Airport 5.90  5.90  5.90  -  1 
Highway 2.18  2.18  2.18  -  1 
Railroad 5.60  0.40  2.71  2.25  5 
Road 1.44  1.11  1.28  0.23  2 
Total 9.53  -28.30  -2.52  8.07  58 
 
b)  FRR with ISPA, Tab 14 and 15, is the financial rate of return when the EU grant enters in the financial 
cash flows forecast of the project proposer. Our data sample shows an average of 6,8%, which is slightly 
above the 6% discount rate adopted by the new EC Guide. This result seems reasonable and expected 
because the “financing gap” approach described above tends to equalize the discount rate and the FRR 
with ISPA. However, the standard deviation by country or sectors is two times the average. The 
extremes are one railroad project in Poland that shows a FRR with ISPA of more than 100%, and a water 
project in Czech Republic that has negative returns of –17% even after the EU grant. Water project on 
average have a negative FRR  even after ISPA, while some road and railroad project have very high 
returns. On average the ISPA grant allows a difference of 8,13 points (between the “with” and “without” 
grant FRR), see Tab 16 and 17.  
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Tab. 14. FRR with ISPA – Breakdown by countries 
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Bulgaria 8.00  4.00  6.00  2.83  2 
Czech Republic  11.97  -17.00  0.18  9.40  21 
Estonia  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Hungary 17.19  -5.52  2.27  6.19  11 
Lithuania 17.00  1.30  6.22  5.08  7 
Latvia 19.40  -3.50  5.16  6.95  8 
Poland 102.60  5.60  18.81  23.02  17 
Romania 10.70  1.28  6.67  3.21  7 
Slovenia 23.00  1.50  8.41  9.84  4 
Slovakia 10.08  3.00  6.54  5.01  2 
Total 102.60  -17.00  6.82  13.93  79 
 
Tab. 15. FRR with ISPA – Breakdown by sectors 
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Water and environment  8.00  -17.00  -2.65  8.29  17 
Sewage 36.30  -2.88  7.71  7.62  26 
Environmental protection  13.94  -3.50  5.58  4.61  12 
Waste management  26.10  -5.52  5.37  8.94  11 
Airport 13.10  13.10  13.10  -  1 
Highway  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Railroad 102.60  5.00  25.97  34.23  7 
Road 19.40  2.00  12.47  6.68  5 
Total 102.60  -17.00  6.82  13.93  79 
 
Tab. 16. FRR with ISPA - FRR without ISPA – Breakdown by countries 
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Bulgaria 3  3  3  -  1 
Czech Republic  16.60  -0.50  7.74  4.16  16 
Estonia  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Hungary 11.68  2.13  5.58  2.96  10 
Lithuania 6.53  1.30  3.92  3.70  2 
Latvia 18.29  5.40  9.95  4.90  5 
Poland 102.20  -3.50  13.96  29.62  11 
Romania 4.59  1.70  3.43  1.53  3 
Slovenia 18.60  -2.30  5.38  7.85  5 
Slovakia  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Total 102.20  -3.50  8.13  13.93  53 
 
Tab. 17. FRR with ISPA - FRR without ISPA –Breakdown by sectors 
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Water and environment  12.60  -0.50  6.30  3.47  15 
Sewage 16.60  -3.50  5.87  4.62  19 
Environmental protection  9.50  2.49  5.32  2.58  5 
Waste management  11.68  2.13  5.12  2.92  8 
Airport 7.20  7.20  7.20  -  1 
Highway  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Railroad 102.20  -2.30  32.93  47.02  4 
Road 18.29  18.29  18.29  -  1 
Total 102.20  -3.50  8.13  13.93  53 
 
c)  ERR, the economic rate of return, Tab 18 and 19, is based on shadow prices and consideration of 
externalities, etc. As expected, the ERR is considerably greater that the FRR, being  around 13% on 
average, with a much smaller variability than the FRR  (standard deviation 8,4). Projects in Poland 
expect particularly high socio-economic returns, around two times the returns expected in Czech 
Republic or in Slovenia. The breakdown by sector shows particularly high returns for roads, more than 
two times the returns of water projects.  
Tab. 18. ERR – Breakdown by countries    -  18  - 
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Bulgaria 23.87  7.78  13.26  6.52  6 
Czech  Republic  18.00 3.30 9.02 3.59  14 
Estonia 14.80  14.00  14.40  0.57  2 
Hungary 30.90  1.00  12.62  7.61  18 
Lithuania  50.00  2.80 12.71 14.42  10 
Latvia 19.00  7.00  12.20  4.93  8 
Poland 40.00  5.99  17.64  9.67  27 
Romania 30.00  0.00  12.17  7.65  21 
Slovenia  17.00 1.01 8.34 5.02  7 
Slovakia 17.90  9.00  12.33  3.47  5 
Total 50.00  0.00  13.04  8.37  118 
 
Tab. 19. ERR – Breakdown by sectors 
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Water and environment  20.34  0.00  8.54  6.31  7 
Sewage 38.71  1.01  11.15  7.71  32 
Environmental protection  27.00  7.62  14.73  6.08  11 
Waste management  40.00  0.00  12.57  11.75  13 
Airport 13.10  8.40  10.75  3.32  2 
Highway 23.87  7.50  13.55  5.03  11 
Railroad 19.00  1.00  10.48  4.15  18 
Road 50.00  7.00  18.23  10.34  24 
Total 50.00  0.00  13.04  8.37  118 
 
d)  Co-financing rate (CFR), Tab 20 and 21, is the amount of EU grant on eligible costs, and is eventually is 
the key decision by the Commission. This information is available for 191 projects, and it reveals an 
average value of around 64%, however with sizeable differences among countries. Countries above the 
average are Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, Latvia; countries below the average are Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, and Hungary. When we consider the breakdown by sector, there is less dispersion of the CFR 
around the average: road being more clearly above the average. 
 
Tab. 20. Co-financing rate – Breakdown by countries  
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Bulgaria 75  37  69.07  12.33  14 
Czech Republic  70  50  60.83  6.03  12 
Estonia 84  56  72.42  7.00  12 
Hungary 75  50  56.70  9.50  23 
Lithuania 75  36  58.43  13.29  21 
Latvia 75  47  70.00  9.05  17 
Poland 75  49  65.26  8.39  42 
Romania 75  68  74.04  1.94  24 
Slovenia 75  39  51.80  9.72  10 
Slovakia 75  49  54.13  8.79  16 
Total 84  36  63.82  11.26  191 
 
Tab. 21. Co-financing rate – Breakdown by sectors 
 Max  Min  Average  SD  Sample 
Water and environment  84  50  62.77  11.65  13 
Sewage 75  44  62.33  10.05  70 
Environmental protection  75  47  67.04  9.32  23 
Waste management  75  49  62.88  10.21  26 
Airport 75  37  56.00  26.87  2 
Highway 75  52  66.50  9.46  8 
Railroad 75  36  60.92  13.94  26 
Road 75  36  69.78  11.88  23 
Total 84  36  63.82  11.26  191 
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These descriptive statistics, compounded with previous research on ERDF, Cohesion Fund, World Bank and 
EBRD projects tell us something about the existence of different sources of variability of either performance 
indicators and co-financing decision. However, we need a slightly more technical analysis to be able to 
interpret our results.  
 
5. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
 
Because of the high variance of the samples, we wish to test how confident we can be that the average 
differences reflect population differences. We took first ISPA grant and then co-financing rate as 
observations in different samples (first countries and then sectors) extracted from the same population, while 
we consider first sectors and then countries as factor.  
Then we study variability among the samples and within the samples in the following way: the total 
deviation can be considered as the sum of the deviation among the groups (SSA) and the deviation within the 
groups (SSW).  
SST=SSA+SSW 
It can be demonstrated that the ratio of variance among and within groups has distribution F with r-1 and N-r 
degrees of freedom10 and we use this statistics for checking the null hypothesis:  
H0: µ1 =µ2 = µ3 = …= µr 
against the alternative H1: µi ≠ µj for at least one pair of value. With the null hypothesis we postulate the zero 
effect of the level factor on the variable.  
Tab. 22 Analysis of variance and components of variance 
Variability sources  Sum of squares  Degree of freedom   Mean squares  F  Significance level  critical F   Test result 
Among groups  SSA  r-1 SSA / (r-1) (SSA / (r-1))/ (SSW / (r- p(F) p(α)  Acc or Rej 
Within groups  SSW N-r  SSW / (r-1)         
Total SST N-1           
 
In the first analysis we took countries as samples and sectors as factor. Our observations are the amount of 
ISPA grants.  
 
Tab. 23 Average value of ISPA grant (million of Euro) –Breakdown by countries and sectors 
 Bulgaria  Czech  Republic  Estonia  Hungary  Lithuania Latvia  Poland  Romania Slovenia Slovakia 
 
Water and environment    32.35  4.58        24.81  20.93  6.38  10.89 
Environmental protection    11.01  5.14  7.25  20.00  16.28  28.09  23.76    19.60 
Road 30.00    12.15  37.07  14.88  12.62  47.29  84.27     
Railroad 153.00  39.33    75.33  45.56  28.22  67.57  231.73  9.28  47.91 
Airport  50.00          84.21       
Highway    19.10        130.36  71.72    27.15 
Sewage 13.11  14.70  6.94  16.40  6.02  4.24  27.25  34.06  5.75  9.05 
Waste management  45.43    4.58  14.87  6.59  3.03  13.51  10.69  4.97   
 
From the results obtained we accept in the first case H0, that is to say the hypothesis that the equality of the 
average values of ISPA grant is statistically significant. This means that the ISPA grant variance is explained 
                                                      
10 r is the number of factor and N is the total of observations.    -  20  - 
by the difference among sectors more than the ones among countries. Explanation of this result is well 
understandable: in absolute terms some sectors need more investments than others.  
 
Tab. 24 Basic data for analysis of variance  
Groups Observations  Sums  Average  Variance 
Bulgaria 5  291.54  58.31  3011.45 
Czech Republic  5  116.49  23.30  145.39 
Estonia 5  33.39  6.68  10.30 
Hungary 5  150.92  30.18  758.87 
Lithuania 5  93.05  18.61  261.34 
Latvia 5  64.39  12.88  104.69 
Poland 8  423.09  52.89  1548.62 
Romania 7  477.16  68.17  5949.13 
Slovenia 4  26.39  6.60  3.54 
Slovakia 5  114.61  22.92  247.65 
 
Tab. 25 Variance analysis: factor is sector 
Variability sources  Sum of squares  Degree of freedom   Mean squares  F  Significance level  critical F   Test result 
Among groups  25352.08  9  2816.898  1.916  0.075  2.101  ACC. H0 
Within groups  64704.51  44  1470.557         
Total 90056.59  53           
N.B. Countries are the samples of a populations and sectors are the levels of a factor.  
 
The same analysis is conducted considering sectors like sample and countries like factors. The analysis of 
variance confirms the same results: F value is above the critical F value, the one for the acceptance of H0.  
So we reject the hypothesis that the equality of average values for sectors is statistically significant, that 
means that variance of Ispa grants is explained by sectors and not by countries.  
 
Tab. 26 Basic data for analysis of variance 
Groups Observations  Sums  Average  Variance 
Water and environment  6  99.95  16.66  123.13 
Environmental protection  8  131.12  16.39  64.80 
Road 7  238.28  34.04  671.60 
Railroad 9  697.94  77.55  5003.05 
Airport 2  134.21  67.11  585.21 
Highway 4  248.33  62.08  2607.28 
Sewage 10  137.51  13.75  98.43 
Waste management  8  103.69  12.96  190.96 
 
Tab. 27 Variance analysis: factor is country 
Variability sources  Sum of squares  Degree of freedom   Mean squares  F  Significance level  critical F   Test result 
Among groups  34303.6794  7  4900.526  4.04 0.002  2.216  REJ. H0 
Within groups  55752.9103  46  1212.020         
Total 90056.5897  53           
N.B. Sectors are the samples of a populations and countries are the levels of a factor. 
 
Results are the opposite if we take co-financing rate as observations. First of all we calculate the average 
value for countries and sectors (countries are the sample and sectors are factors).  
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Tab. 28 Average value of co-financing ISPA rate – Breakdown by countries and sectors 
 Bulgaria  Czech  Republic  Estonia  Hungary  Lithuania Latvia  Poland Romania  Slovenia  Slovakia 
Water  and  environment    70.00 79.50       58.40 75.00 50.00 60.00 
Airport  37.00        75.00    
Highway    60.00      75.00  75.00   52.00 
Railroad  45.00  53.33   50.80 36.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 54.67 58.33 
Sewage  73.50  65.00 69.75 50.00 59.00 66.50 61.37 73.63 51.00 49.89 
Environmental  protection    62.50 68.67 50.00 50.00 68.00 60.00 73.29   70.00 
Waste  management  75.00   75.00 63.64 58.00 49.00 62.67 75.00 50.00   
Road  75.00   75.00 50.00 63.33 75.00 75.00 75.00     
 
From the analysis o variance we have that F value is above the critical F value, that is to say that the 
hypothesis that the equality of average value of co-financing rates is statistically significant is to be rejected. 
The concluding remark is that the variance of co-financing rate is explained by the variance among countries 
and not by the one among sectors.  
 
Tab. 29 Basic data for analysis of variance  
Groups Observations  Sums  Average  Variance 
Bulgaria 5  305.50  61.10  345.05 
Czech Republic  5  310.83  62.17  38.06 
Estonia 5  367.92  73.58  19.47 
Hungary 5  264.44  52.89  36.23 
Lithuania 5  266.33  53.27  116.36 
Latvia 5  333.50  66.70  113.20 
Poland 8  542.44  67.80  60.61 
Romania 7  521.91  74.56  0.58 
Slovenia 4  205.67  51.42  4.92 
Slovakia 5  290.22  58.04  62.47 
 
Tab. 30 Variance analysis: factor is sector 
Variability sources  Sum of squares  Degree of freedom   Mean squares  F  Significance level  critical F   Test result 
Among groups  3413.54687  9  379.282986  4.95820447  0.00012983  2.10087592  REJ. H0 
Within groups  3365.82557  44  76.4960356         
Total 6779.37244  53           
N.B. Countries are the samples of a populations and sectors are the levels of a factor.  
This result is confirmed if we use sectors as sample and countries as factors. F test lead to the acceptance of 
equality hypothesis of average values, and moreover more than 90% of the variance of average values of co-
financing rate is determined by the variance among groups (that is to say within each sector by the variance 
among countries), while only 10% is determined by the variance among groups.  
 
Tab. 31 Basic data for analysis of variance  
Groups Observations  Sums  Average  Variance 
Water and Environment  6  392.900  65.483  125.482 
Airport 2  112.000  56.000  722.000 
Highway 4  262.000  65.500  131.000 
Railway 9  523.133  58.126  200.587 
Sewage 10  619.632  61.963  86.419 
Environmental protection  8  502.452  62.807  79.837 
Waste management  8  508.303  63.538  117.172 
Road 7  488.333  69.762  94.841 
   -  22  - 
Tab. 32 Variance analysis: factor is country 
Variability sources  Sum of squares  Degree of freedom   Mean squares  F  Significance level  critical F   Test result 
Among  groups  706.392  7  100.913 0.76437068  0.619769412 2.21641727  ACC. H0 
Within groups  6072.980  46  132.021         
Total 6779.372  53           
N.B. Sectors are the samples of a populations and countries are the levels of a factor.  
 
This result suggests that there are some countries which systematically and independently by the sectoral 
breakdown of projects, get co-financing rates on average above the other countries.  
We also made the χ independence test applied to the contingence table: this is the calculation of the sample 
numerousness with the aim of verifying if there is independence between sectors and countries 
characteristics. 
Applying the test we obtain that the hypothesis of independence of countries and sectors in the distribution 
of the observations of ISPA grant is to be rejected, so the two characteristics are dependent or connected, that 
is to say that the distribution of ISPA grant in each sectors depends on countries and/or vice versa.  
 
Tab. 33 Contingency table, sample of ISPA Grant-breakdown by countries and sectors 
 Water  and 
Environment 





Bulgaria   1    1  10    1  1  14 
Czech Republic  1   3 3 3  2     12 
Estonia 2        4  3  1  2  12 
Hungary      5 4  1  11  2 23 
Lithuania      1 7  1  6  6 21 
Latvia      4 2  6  1  4 17 
Poland 5  1  3  5  19  2  3  4  42 
Romania  1   1 1 8  7  2  4 24 
Slovenia  2    3 4    1   10 
Slovakia  2   1 3 9  1     16 
Total  13 2  8 26 70  23  26  23 191 
 
Tab. 34 χ Test 
Critical χ  χ (10-1)(8-1)  Test result 
82 5286  REJ  H0 
 
The same result is obtained applying the test to the co-financing rate, as the starting contingencies table is the 
same. All these results make us suppose that in some countries projects presented have financing gaps 
systematically above that of the other countries, as this is the variable that influence the choice of co-
financing rate.  
 
If we want now to consider the quality of the proposed projects, i.e. economic and social profitability, it is 
necessary to analyse the variance of economic internal rate of return of projects (Tab. 35).  
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Tab. 35 Average value of ERR - Breakdown by countries and sectors 
 Bulgaria  Czech  Republic  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia Lithuania Poland  Romania Slovakia  Slovenia 
Airport 8.40            13.10       
Environmental       19.20      7.62  19.97     
Highway   12.00            9.00  12.80   
Railroad   8.41    7.30  11.43    11.15  15.00  10.97  12.68 
Road 17.50    14.00  25.05  10.27  13.20  24.61  19.88     
Sewage 9.92  3.60    11.74  16.25  4.54  20.36  10.00  13.45  3.15 
Waste management        14.02    5.35  23.60  0.00    7.29 
Water and environment              20.34  4.00    6.80 
 
The analysis of the variance leads to a clear cut result: if sectors are factors and countries are the sample the 
hypothesis that the equality of the average values is statistically significant is to be accepted.  
 
Tab. 36 Basic data for analysis of variance  
Groups Observations  Sums  Average  Variance 
Bulgaria  3 35.82 11.94  23.76 
Czech Republic  3  24.01  8.00  17.76 
Estonia  1 14.00 14.00 n.a 
Hungary  5 77.31 15.46  47.12 
Latvia  3 37.95 12.65  10.06 
Lithuania 3  23.09  7.70  22.87 
Poland 7  120.77  17.25  43.47 
Romania  7 77.84 11.12  58.34 
Slovakia  3 37.22 12.41  1.66 
Slovenia 4  29.91  7.48  15.43 
 
Tab. 37 Variance analysis: factor is sector 
Variability sources  Sum of squares  Degree of freedom  Mean squares  F  Significance level  critical F   Test result 
Among  groups  447.01141  9  49.6679345 1.4434065 0.215951048 2.2228761 ACC. H0 
Within groups  997.896303  29  34.41021735         
Total 1444.90771  38           
N.B. Countries are the samples of a populations and sectors are the levels of a factor.  
 
On the opposite side, if sectors are the sample and countries the factors, the result is the same. This means 
that on average the expected quality of projects is similar and no sectoral no national differences 
systematically affect the economic internal rate of return. 
 
Tab. 38 Basic data for analysis of variance  
Groups Observations  Sums  Average  Variance 
Airport  2 21.50 10.75 11.05 
Environmental  protection  3 46.79 15.60 47.85 
Highway  3 33.80 11.27  4.01 
Railroad  7 76.93 10.99  6.57 
Road  7  124.50 17.79 32.61 
Sewage  9 93.00 10.33 34.74 
Waste  management  5 50.26 10.05 82.52 
Water  and  environment  3 31.14 10.38 76.36 
 
Tab. 39 Variance analysis: factor is countries 
Variability sources  Sum of squares  Degree of freedom   Mean squares  F  Significance level  critical F   Test result 
Among  groups  334.283904  7  47.75484337 1.332944721  0.26842678 2.32316921  ACC.  H0 
Within groups  1110.62381  31  35.82657452         
Total 1444.90771  38           
N.B. Sectors are the samples of a populations and countries are the levels of a factor.    -  24  - 
Also with the χ test the hypothesis of independence is to be rejected.  
 
Tab. 40 Contingency table, sample of ERR -breakdown by countries and sectors 
 Water  and 
Environment 





Bulgaria   1      3      1  5 
Czech Republic      3  2  1        6 
Estonia               1  1 
Hungary       4  4  1  7  1  17 
Lithuania         3    2  4  9 
Latvia       3  2      3  8 
Poland 1  1    3  6  1  2  3  17 
Romania 1    1  1  5  3  1  4  16 
Slovenia 1      3  2    1    7 
Slovakia     1  2  2        5 
Total  3 2 5  18  28  5  13  17  91 
 
Tab. 41 χ Test 
Critical χ  χ (10-1)(8-1)  Test result 
82 1205  REJ  H0 
 
We think that this result support the view that the variability of co-financing rate of ISPA projects by the 
European Commission is poorly related to their expected performance, either in financial or socio-economic 
terms.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we have presented new evidence on the considerable effort the Commission is performing with 
the accession countries to co-financing their infrastructure capacity. European Union regional policies may 
play an important role in the process of real convergence across Member States and accession candidates. 
While there is a lively debate about the effectiveness of the current EC strategy and its implementation, it is 
quite uncontroversial that there is a need to raise the quality of development projects, particularly in transport 
and environment. The Commission should be applauded and encouraged to go on with its effort to get better 
infrastructure project proposals, and to change its role from a bureaucratic provider of ear-marked 
development funds to an active partner in the investment decision process. 
As far as project analysis is involved there is room for improvement and we have shown that there is high 
variability of some key indicators that seems more country specific than sector specific. Overall the 
variability of expected financial returns before and after the EU grant is too high, and so is the variability 
across countries of the co-financing rate.  
As far as the Commission development objectives are concerned, some remarks could be made about 
suitable benchmarks for FRR:  
- FRR/C of development projects are expected to be very low, sometimes a negative rate (otherwise there 
would be quite limited justification for public intervention), but the financial sustainability should also be 
considered. From our sample of projects the average FRR/C was minus 2,5%. It seems advisable to use this 
average as a first benchmark. For an FRR/C less than minus 2,5% the applicant should give evidence on how 
the project will be sustainable in the long term, beyond the time horizon. Projects for which evidence is weak 
should be reconsidered or rejected. In future we suggest that a zero percent financial return target could be 
advisable (before EU grants).  
Moreover development projects asking for public grants are not expected to have an excessive return on 
investment, (let us say FRR/C>6%) otherwise the private sector would be more suitable to finance the 
project. 
- FRR/K is expected to be higher than FRR/C but not exceeding a given threshold, otherwise the project is 
maybe asking an excessive grant by EU. From our sample of projects a FRR/K of around 7% is an average 
value, (but with a too high standard deviation). The ratio between standard deviation and average (the 
coefficient of variation).  
- Finally, development objectives (environmental sustainability, equal opportunity, distributional effects) are 
likely to be measured by ERR and not by either FRR/C or FRR/K. Because externalities and shadow prices 
are now considered, most projects with low or negative FRR/C will now show positive ERR. Then projects 
with a low ERR (say ERR< 5%) should be considered low priority by the Commission services. Moreover 
EU grant could offer a premium to the most deserving projects.  
The main idea is that the Commission should be wishing to finance project with a strategic importance for 
development objectives (high ERR), not generating excessive revenues compared with investment costs but 
sustainable in the long term (-3% > FRR/C > 6%) and the EU grant should be not too high as to generate an 
extra rent to the proposer (FRR/K<7%).  
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Obviously the application of the given thresholds must not be too rigid, but should be modulated according 
to sectoral and national specificities.  
Moreover, we would suggest to endow in future this kind of programmes with a further incentive 
mechanism, similar to the Performance Reserve for the Structural Funds (art. 44 Reg. 1260/99). For example 
a fund worth 10% of the total allocation of EU infrastructure funds for a given country could be set aside in 
first instance, and redistributed as a bonus to those projects or project proposers that outperform a given 
benchmark. The benchmark could be the average economic rate of return for projects of the same sector 
across the countries in any given period of time. The objective of this “bonus reserve” would be to 
accompany the financial evaluation with an incentive for high returns in terms of social costs and benefits.  
In conclusion, we suggest to move away from high co-financing of the more financially demanding projects, 
to a system where the most socially deserve projects get a higher level of transfers. In order to do so, 
financial and economic rates of return should be considered jointly, and in comparison with sectoral 
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